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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rogelio Muriel appeals, contending there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of
failing to register as a sex offender because the State's evidence did not show that he had come
into Idaho to establish residence, as the relevant statute requires the State to prove. In fact, the
arresting officer admitted he knew that Mr. Muriel was registered in Oregon at the time. As
such, this Court should vacate the conviction for failure to register.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 12, 2018, Officer Crist was looking for Mr. Muriel based on an active warrant
out of Oregon. (Tr., p.32, Ls.21-24, p.33, L.14 - p.34, L.4.) That officer knew Mr. Muriel was
registered as a sex offender in Vale, Oregon. 1 (Tr., p.37, Ls.19-22.) When he found Mr. Muriel,
Mr. Muriel explained he was in Idaho to visit his brother. (Tr., p.37, Ls.15-17.) The officer
placed him under arrest and found a syringe in Mr. Muriel's bag. (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-23.) Officer
Crist felt that Mr. Muriel had the appearance of a homeless person and did not recall finding any
cash or credit cards when he searched Mr. Muriel. (Tr., p.38, Ls.7-24.) However, Officer Crist
also admitted that "anything over $20 would be more than enough to get around." (Tr., p.48,
Ls.11-13.)
At the jail, another officer searched Mr. Muriel and found a baggie on his person which
ultimately tested positive for methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.58, Ls.15-21, p.71, Ls.12-13.)

He

testified that he could feel that baggie by patting the exterior layer of Mr. Muriel's pants.
1

There was no indication that Mr. Muriel had registered in Idaho. (Tr., p.53, L.19 - p.54, L.3.)
However, while it was not presented during the trial (see generally Tr.), the presentence
investigation report contains a letter from Oregon confirming that Mr. Muriel would be
considered in compliance with Oregon's registration requirements unless he had moved out of
that state. (Con£ Docs., p.84.)

1

(Tr., p.60, Ls.4-12.) He explained that it was in the smaller "watch pocket" inside the main
pocket in which a person would put their hands. (Tr., p.58, Ls.15-21.) Officer Crist admitted
that, though he had not found the baggie, he had been specifically looking for drugs during his
initial search of Mr. Muriel because the relevant policy states that he is responsible for finding
and removing all such items before taking a person to the jail. (Tr., p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.3.) His
only explanation for his failure in this regard was that, sometimes, the field officers miss stuff
(Tr., p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.2.)
The State ultimately charged Mr. Muriel with possession of a controlled substance under
LC. § 37-2732(c) for possession of methamphetamine and failure to register as a sex offender
under LC. § 18-8307(4)(a) for "failing to register within two (2) working days of coming into
Ada County to establish residence." (Aug. pp.1-2.) 2 Mr. Muriel waived his right to a jury trial,
opting for a bench trial instead. (Aug. p.8.)
At the trial, the State presented the testimony of several officers who had encounters with
Mr. Muriel at various times over the year preceding his arrest in this case. For example, in June
2017, Mr. Muriel was hit by a car, and when officers talked with him, he said he did not have an
address or phone number. (Tr., p.78, Ls.17-19.) The officers involved recalled that Mr. Muriel
appeared to be homeless, and he did not appear to have any ability to travel.
L.21 - p.78, L.4; Tr., p.81, Ls.13-19.)

(Tr., p. 77,

They also noted that Mr. Muriel had an active,

extraditable warrant from Oregon at that time and that the warrant was served on him when he
was discharged from the hospital.

(Tr., p. 75, L.23 - p. 76, L.13, p. 78, Ls.17-19; Tr., p.80,

L.24 - p.81, L.9.)

2

A motion to augment the record with a copy of the Information, as well as several other
documents, has been filed contemporaneously with this brief
2

Officers next reported two contacts with Mr. Muriel in January 2018. (Tr., p.83, Ls.2-7
(regarding an incident on January 16, 2018); Tr., p.87, Ls.15-20, p.90, Ls.16-22 (regarding an
incident on January 26, 2018).) Those officers testified that Mr. Muriel gave a different name
during those encounters and that they only learned it was an alias after the fact.

(Tr., p.83,

Ls.20-22, p.91, Ls.6-12.) During the January 16 encounter, he told the officer he had been in
Boise for several weeks. (Tr., p.84, Ls.21-22.) Some, though not all, of the officers involved in
those incidents recalled Mr. Muriel as having the appearance of a homeless person and did not
see any indication of an ability to travel. (Compare Tr., p.84, Ls.1-3, p.86, Ls.3-8; and Tr., p.92,
Ls.18-23, p.93, Ls.2-4; with Tr., p.89, Ls.1-13.)
Then, on February 4, 2018, Mr. Muriel was arrested after being removed from a bar
where he had been a patron. (Tr., p.96, Ls.1-15, p.98, L.25 - p.99, L.6.) The officer involved did
not recall finding any large sums of cash on Mr. Muriel, but admitted bar patrons usually have
some form of payment. (Tr., p.98, L.18 - p.99, L.9.) Mr. Muriel gave the same alias that he had
during the January 2018 encounters. (See Tr., p.96, Ls.16-20.) While he was being processed on
that case, the officers discovered his actual identity. (See Tr., p.100, L.18 - p.101, L.13.) Upon
learning his identity, they also learned that he had an active warrant in Oregon. (Tr., p.97,
Ls.13-18.)

There was no indication whether the Oregon warrant was served at that time.

(See generally Tr.)

Still, it was not until some three months later, May 23, 2018, that Mr. Muriel was seen in
Idaho again. (See Tr., p.102, L.15 - p.103, L.1.) The officer who was involved in that incident
did not explain why he encountered Mr. Muriel at that time.

(See generally Tr.)

In fact,

Mr. Muriel did not provide his name or identification during that encounter, nor does it appear
the officer asked him for such. (See Tr., p.103, Ls.5-13.) The officer also did not observe

3

anything that made him suspect Mr. Muriel was transient at that time. (Tr., p.103, L.22 - p.104,
L.3.) However, he did recall that Mr. Muriel had $18 in cash on at that time. (Tr., p.104, Ls.48.)
Finally, officers encountered Mr. Muriel on June 5, 2018. They recalled that he gave the
same alias he had given before. (Tr., p.109, Ls.11-18.) They learned it was an alias, and so, also
checked Mr. Muriel's real name. (Tr., p.109, L.25 - p.110, L.12.) They learned that he did not
have any active warrants at that time. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-12.) They also testified that Mr. Muriel
appeared to be homeless and without an ability to travel independently. (Tr., p.105, Ls.12-20,
p.107, Ls.16-20; Tr., p.110, L.18 - p.111, L.2.)

In fact, they remembered him having a

panhandling sign at the time. (Tr., p.107, Ls.9-11.)
Based on those periodic encounters, the prosecutor argued the district court could infer
that Mr. Muriel had been living in Idaho for some time. (Tr., p.114, L.21 - p.115, L.6.) Defense
counsel countered, asserting there was no proof that Mr. Muriel did not travel back to Oregon in
between the encounters with Idaho police, for example, to deal with his warrants in Oregon.
(Tr., p.116, Ls.6-8.) Defense counsel also asserted that it was not prohibitively expensive to get
a bus ticket from Ontario to Boise. (Tr., p.116, Ls.20-25.)
The district court ultimately found that the evidence showed Mr. Muriel had been living
m Idaho since January 2018, and so, found him guilty on the failure to register charge.
(Tr., p.121, L.25 - p.122, L.22.) It also found him guilty on the possession charge. (Tr., p.119,
L.20 - p.120, L.17.) Subsequently, it found him guilty on a persistent violator enhancement.
(Tr., p.1255, L.7 - p.126, L.3.) As a result, it imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years, with
five years fixed, on each charge. (Tr., p.137, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Muriel filed a notice of appeal
timely from the resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.154, 166.)

4

ISSUE
Whether there was insufficient evidence to find Mr. Muriel guilty of failure to register.

5

ARGUMENT
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Find Mr. Muriel Guilty Of Failure To Register

A.

Standard Of Review
When a criminal action has been tried via a bench trial, "appellate review of the

sufficiency of the evidence is limited to ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence upon
which the court could have found that the prosecution met its burden of proving the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Stark, 157 Idaho 29, 31 (Ct. App.
2013). The appellate court will not substitute its judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id.

B.

There Was Not Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Mr. Muriel Stayed In Idaho For Necessary Amount Of Continuous Time To Trigger A
Duty To Register In Idaho
In order to understand why the State's evidence is not sufficient to support the district

court's verdict, it is important to understand the elements of the offense that was charged in this
case.

The State specifically charged Mr. Muriel under LC. § 18-8307(4)(a) for "failing to

register within two (2) working days of coming into Ada County to establish residence." (Aug.
pp.1-2.) The problem in this case is that the State failed to present any evidence that Mr. Muriel
had come into Ada County to establish residence. In fact, the officers knew that Mr. Muriel had
registered his residence as a sex offender in Oregon at the time of his arrest in this case.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.19-22.)

6

In this regard, this case is similar to State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 562 (2012). In Lee, the
State charged Mr. Lee with failing to register under LC. § 18-8307(1)(a) (2001). 3 It sought to
prove that he changed his address to another residence in Idaho by presenting as evidence a letter
which had been sent to his registered address, but which had been forwarded to another
addresses in Idaho and ultimately returned with a handwritten notation of "Does Not Live Here."
Id.

The State argued that the jury could infer Mr. Lee had changed his address from the

additional notations on the envelope. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, stating generally: "The State Never Proved that Lee
Moved to a New Address or Actual Residence in Idaho." Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court
held that the inference the State wanted the jury to draw was improper because there was no
evidence as to who put the notation on the letter or how they knew Mr. Lee had actually changed
his residence to the new address. Id. Moreover, the Court held, there was no evidence offered
from the post office to show that Mr. Lee had actually changed his residence at all. Id. As a
result, it held the State had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Lee had come into
"any county to establish residence or temporary domicile." 4 Id.
The necessary facts that were missing in Lee are also missing in Mr. Muriel's case - there
1s no evidence from any source indicating that Mr. Muriel ever came into Ada County to
establish residence. As in 2001, chapter 83 defines the term "residence" as referring to "the
3

Idaho Code § 18-8307 was reformulated in 2005, and part of the change was to move the
registration requirements from subsection (l)(a) to the newly-created subsection (4)(a). 2005
Idaho Laws Ch. 233. Though it has been amended several times since 2005, subsection (4)(a)
remains the same in substance as it was in 2005. See 2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 311; 2006 Idaho
Laws Ch. 178. As such, the analysis conducted in Lee with regard to the old subsection (l)(a) is
applicable to the analysis under the new subsection (4)(a) in Mr. Muriel's case.
4
One of the changes to LC. § 18-8307(4)(a) was to remove the "permanent or temporary"
language from the statute. 2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 311. As such, at the time relevant to
Mr. Muriel's case, the only conduct covered by subsection (4)(a) was "coming into any count to
establish residence."
7

offender's present place of abode." Compare I. C. § 18-8303( 15) with 2000 Idaho Laws Ch. 469
(reciting the definition of residence, then contained in LC. § 18-8303(10)).

"Abode" is not

defined in the statute, but, by its ordinary usage, it refers to "[a] home; a fixed place of residence.

See

DOMICILE."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2 (3rd pocket ed. 2006); accord MERRIAM-

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2 (2007).

"Domicile" is also not defined in the

statute, but, also by its plain usage, it refers to the place where a person is present and regards as
home, but in the nature of his "true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person
intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere." 5

BLACK'S LAw

DICTIONARY, 223.
Here, as in Lee, there was only evidence of one residence - in Vale, Oregon where
Officer Crist knew Mr. Muriel maintained his registration as a sex offender. (See Tr., p.37,
Ls.19-22.) As in Lee, there was no evidence that Mr. Muriel had changed his residence from
Oregon.

Rather, the evidence indicates that was the place to which Mr. Muriel intended to

return, even though he might currently be staying elsewhere. Notably, the evidence shows that
Mr. Muriel actually did return to Oregon to handle his affairs there. For example, he was not
seen in Idaho between February 4, 2018, and May 23, 2018.

That is important because, in

February 2018, he had an active warrant out of Oregon, but by June 5, he no longer had any
warrants out of Oregon.

(Compare Tr., p.97, Ls.13-18, with Tr., p.110, Ls.10-12.) Thus, the

5

The evidence bears out that Mr. Muriel did not consider his domicile to be in Idaho, as several
of the officers described Mr. Muriel's appearance in Idaho as "transient." (E.g., Tr., 81, Ls.1415; Tr., p.97, L.24 - p.98, L.3.) The plain usage of the term "transient" refers to a person
"passing through a place with only a brief stay." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS, 844; accord BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 730.
8

evidence strongly indicates that, in that three-month gap, Mr. Muriel returned to Oregon, to his
place ofresidence, and resolved the outstanding warrant. 6
Moreover, as Officer Crist admitted, "anything over $20 would be more than enough to
get around." (Tr., p.48, Ls.11-13.) There was even evidence that Mr. Muriel had such funds
available to him.

Notably, one officer met Mr. Muriel when he had $18 in cash on him.

(Tr., p.104, Ls.4-8) Another officer met him immediately after he had been patronizing a bar,
which, the officer admitted, indicated he had some ability to pay for drinks. (Tr., p.98, L.25 p.99, L.9.) As such, that evidence shows Mr. Muriel did have access to sufficient funds to travel
between Oregon and Idaho.

(See Tr., p.116, Ls.20-25 (defense counsel's argument to this

effect).)
As such, the State's inference in this case - that Mr. Muriel's repeated presence in Idaho
could only mean he was staying here for an extended period of time - is insufficient for the same
reason the inference the State wanted the jury to draw in Lee was insufficient: it does not show
the defendant actually changing his residence to somewhere in Idaho. See Lee, 153 Idaho at 562.
And even if the State's inference were valid, it still would not prove Mr. Muriel guilty under
I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a), because the fact that he might be staying here does not show an intent to
change his permanent residence, his abode or domicile, to Idaho. Compare Lee, 153 Idaho at
562 (finding there was insufficient evidence when there was no evidence that the defendant had
changed his address to a place in Idaho).
As such, under any view of the facts, there was insufficient evidence to prove Mr. Muriel
guilty under that code section. Therefore, as in Lee, the conviction on that charge should be
vacated.

6

Whether the warrant was resolved by May 23 or June 5 is, ultimately, irrelevant, because either
way, it indicates Mr. Muriel returned to his place of residence in Oregon to resolve that warrant.
9

CONCLUSION
Mr. Muriel respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction for failure to register.
DATED this 20 th day of February, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of February, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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